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Abstract 
Theory of economic regulation gained importance in economics literature in the era of 1990s. Market failure 
caused by market imperfections has legitimized government intervention and regulation in the economic affairs 
of state. But positive response to regulation in developed countries and failure of regulatory institutions in 
developing countries have created doubts about the role of regulation in developing countries. This study is an 
effort to explore relation between regulatory quality and employment generation in 6 developing economies of 
Asia namely China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand, using data from 1996 to 2011. 
Panel Model has been assessed by using fixed effects technique and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
We have found a strong positive effect of regulatory quality on level of employment in selected economies. We 
suggest enhancing quality of regulatory institutions to tackle the issue of wide range unemployment in 
developing economies like of Asia. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic growth and development are thought to be greatly affected by regulatory quality of government by the 
researchers and practitioners now a day (e.g. World Bank, 2004). Government can regulate economies in many 
ways and developing countries have used different options in this regard over the time. In the era of 1960s to 
1980s, the logic forwarded for the intervention of government in economy was the failure of markets. Thus 
government intervention in productive activities directly through investment in agriculture and industry and 
enhancing imports for industrialization, or by promoting privatization (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, & Parker, 2007). 
A World Bank report in 2005 has indicated that due to the failure of state regulation in many of the developing 
and countries while success in developed nations has created doubts about the role of regulation. Thus now the 
role of government regulation has been more in depth demarcated. Now that regulation is supported which help 
competitive markets to function more properly. Deregulation often imposed as a subset of structural adjustment 
programs of the economies. Developing countries have faced a lot of issues and problems in the face of their 
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liberalization and privatization programs which has reinforced the need for a regulatory state in these countries 
(Majone, 1994, 1997).  
Such models imply state regulation only in those areas which cannot perform well in the absence of state 
regulation leaving all others in free competitive environment. But developing countries owing to their poor 
governance structures and low quality of regulatory institutions have very remote prospects of success in this 
context. The success of this state in developing economies greatly depends on the quality of regulatory 
institutions. Thus the quality of the institutions will determine the efficiency of the markets in these economies. 
Regulatory quality will affect the outcomes of regulation in terms of market effectiveness and thus the pace of 
economic growth and level of employment in that particular economy (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, & Parker, 2007). 
The paper is an attempt to explore   impact of  regulatory quality of the government on  level of employment in 
the economy through the use of an econometric model. Government can use many types of regulatory policies to 
affect employment in the economy. Policies aimed at enhancing GDP growth, generation of employment 
opportunities along with increased wages lead to reduce poverty in economy. Public spending for health, 
education and infrastructure are the major public policies in this regard. Economic theory predicts that public 
spending corrects the market failure created by negative externalities like pollution. Public regulatory policies 
like taxes and subsidies can be used to create positive externalities through public provision of education and 
health. Thus in case of pure public goods government intervention becomes inexorable. Theoretically, 
distribution of resources in a market base economy remains unequal and government has to intervene to 
compensate the unprivileged poor classes through regulation. Education and health spending promote 
employment and productivity and help government to make an efficient allocation of resources leading to higher 
level of employment (Hassan, 2008). Governments also use subsidies as a regulatory policy to generate 
employment. These normally depend on the recruitment, existing and change in employment stock.  Different 
types of labor with respect to their age, gender, religion, time duration of unemployment or education or in 
general may be addressed with these subsidies. The subsidy can take form of either direct payment to labor or 
employer or can be granted via tax credit schemes (Bishop & Haveman, 1979). Earlier many researchers have 
explored impact of governance on economic growth like (Olson, et al.,1998; Kauffman and Kraay, 2002), but we 
in this paper have focused only one dimension of governance and checked its impact on the level of employment 
in the economy rather than GDP growth. Results of the study have confirmed the fact that a good state of 
regulatory quality affects  level of employment positively. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 is a brief review of the literature, section three creates 
theoretical support for the study and derives hypothesis. Section4 explains the data used and estimation 
technique applied for the analysis. In section 5 and 6 we have discussed the results and concluded our research 
respectively. 
2. Literature Review 
Effectiveness of the regulatory quality of any economy is measured through its success in achieving the welfare 
goals of the state. If the goal of development, employment and poverty reduction of the economy has been 
achieved then it means the institutions have delivered their potential. Efficiency of the regulatory quality requires 
that these welfare oriented goals must be achieved at minimal costs. Economic costs of these regulations are two 
one is the administering cost and other is the compliance cost (Guasch and Hahn, 1999).  Good governance of 
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the economy is another criterion to check the outcome of the regulatory quality. A developed institutional 
structure enhances the regulatory efficiency of the economy and hence its development and employment 
(Parker1999: 224). 
In developing countries regulation has given disappointing outcomes.  (Jacobs, 2004) have blamed this failure to 
the low quality and untrained regulator staff of these regulatory institutions in his study of 13 Asian economies. 
While (Ugaz, 2003) have put the blame on the lack of political will and support for the regulatory institutions in 
case of Latin America. 
 Individual country studies have also identified reasons for the failure of regulatory policies in different 
developing economies. Like in India poorly built institutions and bureaucratic malpractices have caused failure 
of the regulation there (Lanyi, 2000). Similarly lack of transparency in the responsibility structure of the 
regulatory authorities in South Africa, dependency of industry regulation on state regulation in Malawi, political 
biasedness in policy making in Sri Lanka are some other reasons limiting the efficiency of regulatory policies   
(Schwella, 2002: 3) and (Knight-John, 2002).  Due to this dilemma, the World Bank (2001: v) has stressed the 
importance of  
“Improving regulatory regimes and building institutions and capacity effectively to supervise the 
private sector” 
Owing to above phenomenon literature has greatly emphasized the need for improving the regulatory quality of 
the institutions to make the economies perform better. In this regard regulatory quality is the major variable. Two 
major indicators of governance are mainly used by the researchers to judge the regulatory quality. They are 
ICRG (international country risk guide) covering political, economic and financial risk facing the economy 
published by political risk services group (Neumayer, 2002; Olson et al., 1998). Second measures of governance 
quality are world governance indicators consisting of six aggregate indicators (Voice and accountability, 
Political instability, Government effectiveness quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption) . data is derived 
fron 194 measure by World Banks (Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005).  
We have focused on the regulatory quality and have taken it form the world governance indicators as we are 
interested to check its impact on the level of employment.  Regulatory quality index is constructed to measure 
the burden of regulation on business due to the inefficiency of the quantitative controls and is used as a proxy for 
the effectiveness of the results of the applying regulatory instruments. 
Most of the literature available on the regulatory quality normally correlates it with economic performance, GDP 
growth and economic development. From this notion we have cited these studies to create their link with 
employment generation because if regulatory quality is affecting economic performance and per capita income 
positively then we can induce that it must be affecting employment positively as well. Kauffman et al (2005: 38) 
established a positive link between incomes per capita and good governance in cross country regressions. They 
suggested on the basis of empirical evidence that governance increases per capita incomes. 
(Jalilian, et al., 2007) applied two different econometric techniques to explore the impact of regulatory quality on 
economic performance and came to the same conclusion that regulatory quality has a strong causal relationship 
with economic performance of the economy. Thus he suggested that in developing economies only regulatory 
policy design should not be a focus but a similar attention must be paid to the quality and capacity of institutions 
supporting regulation. 
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(Besley & Burgess, 2004) examined the regulation of industrial relation impact on manufacturing growth in 
India from 1958-1992. They found that a low level of production, employment and investment was experienced 
by the states that modified Industrial Disputes Act in favor of workers. While unregistered manufacturing sector 
raised their employment level in this period.  This pro-worker regulation also increased poverty in the urban 
areas. Their findings suggested that all the efforts to rebalance authority and power in labor-capital relations 
resulted in rising poverty in the economy of India. 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006) empirically examined a longitudinal sample of 89 West Bengal villages targeting 
their credit, agricultural input kits, employment programs and fiscal grants from the period of 1978-98.  The 
study was to test the hypothesis that decentralization (a type of regulation) results in the capture of local 
government by the local elites due to extreme poverty, inequality and lesser political competition at local level. 
Poor were adversely affected by this regulation mainly due to their extreme poverty, land inequality and low 
caste composition. While this regulation and decentralization generated very few jobs having negligible impact 
on employment rate out of the funds allotted for this very purpose. Thus regulation and decentralization failed in 
Bengal to generate employment for the rural population. 
(Hassan, 2008) claimed that Economic growth, employment and wages helped a great deal in breaking the 
vicious circle of poverty in Bangladesh. Data from 1995 to 2006 was used to determine a link between public 
spending, employment and poverty for the Bangladesh economy in an analytical framework.  Study first 
analyzed impact of public expenditures on determinants of GDP growth and the on poverty status. The study has 
claimed that poverty is affected by the public spending through the channels of economic growth, generation of 
employment opportunities and by increasing wages. Government intervention through spending on education, 
health and infrastructure reduce poverty significantly. Study recommended diverting public expenditures to pro-
poor sectors. The results of the study are not significant enough due to the interpolation of poverty and 
employment and very small observations on disaggregated expenditures. 
We also have studies quoting impact of different individual regulatory policies of the government on labor 
demand, labor composition and employment. We will also cite some of them here to support our proposed link 
between regulatory policies and employment. 
(Morrison Paul & Siegel, 2001) simultaneously assessed the impacts of trade, technology, and outsourcing on 
shifts in labor demand using a dynamic cost function framework and comprehensive measures of workforce 
composition and investment in technology. He found that technology was major factor affecting the shifts in 
labor demand, while trade by influencing computerization and then labor demand had indirect impact. The paper 
has used a dynamic flexible cost function, this simultaneous model allows the adjustment of capital in 
accordance with price changes and recognizes the difference between short and long run equilibrium which was 
a weakness of earlier studies. Many possible determinants of labor demand have been included in the model and 
effects of labor composition are also deeply analyzed. Technology is found to have greater effects on 
employment and labor composition then trade or outsourcing by favoring highly educated labor force. Trade 
affects the demand for less educated workers negatively.  Interaction of trade and computerization reflects that 
trade increase the pace of computerization which affects the demand for labor without college degree negatively 
and the demand for labor with college degree positively. 
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Subsidies are also a tool for the government to regulate economy and to generate employment. As (Bishop & 
Haveman, 1979) stated that due to grant of subsidies Oken’s law may be canceled out  because it reduces 
unemployment in larger number than the rise in labor force participation rate. Policy brings results by increasing 
the GDP and by the redistribution of the costs of unemployment. The authors concluded that SESP help reducing 
unemployment, composition of labor is also improved, NAIRU can be reduced, and prices are reduced as well. 
But for the sake of this benefit subsidies do incur cost as well. There are problems in the administration of the 
SESP, they can turn-over the labor, and favors fast growing regions, may cause displacement of workers in case 
of targeted selective group subsidies.  
Wage subsidies and employment subsidies are now given the name of employment tax credit mostly applied to a 
particular group of workers. In the rigid wage regions wage subsidies prove more powerful than the subsidy on 
capital or output or tariff.  Kaldor (1936) claimed that ETC under different reasonable assumption can be the 
most favored policy for generation employment in the economy. 1949 to 1977 Ragnar Frisch also explained the 
concept of ETC at macro level. ETC van be in many shapes, it can be a tax credit to firms in proportion their 
employment, it can be fixed amount per man per hour employed, it can be provided to the firms in a certain 
percentage of their wage bill and lastly it can be a wage rate subsidy here credit is given proportional to man 
hour and inversely proportional to wage rate. The authors proposed an alternative to the historical experience of 
US from 1962 to 1971 and compared ETC with ITC (investment tax credit). There is a modest gain in total 
employment expansion from specifying an ETC as an amount per man-hour rather than as a percent of wage bill. 
They claimed that applying ETC reduce production cost the level and distribution of employment is also affected 
considerably( Jonathan (Kesselman, Williamson, & Berndt, 1977). 
Government also uses its regulatory authority via support pricing of agricultural products which results in the 
change of employment level and patterns in the economy. Studies to check the impact of NAFTA mandatory 
reduction in the support price of corn claimed that it decreased the rural employment and wages along with 
higher trend of rural urban migration. Authors in this study have considered the sectorial divergences of farm 
household economies by modeling an alternative approach. Using a village-town CGE model and micro survey 
data, they proved that the liberalization of staple prices in Mexico exerted very little effects on the rural wages 
because of the substitution of resources by the farmers. Thus liberalization had positive effect on their incomes 
generally. They stated that price decoupling policies may enhance staple production in some areas of subsistence 
economies (Taylor, Yúnez-Naude, & Dyer, 1999).  
(Berck & Hoffmann, 2002) examined four different approaches to check the environmental and natural resource 
policy on employment and Environmental and natural resource policies can affect employment through two 
major paths of action: actions that change the availability of a factor and actions that change the cost of 
production.  
Regulation can also be imposed by regulating international trade. Many empirical findings have been quoted in 
the literature giving mixed impact of trade and outsourcing on labor demand.  Katz and Murphy (1992) claimed 
that relative wage change was not caused by increased import intensity. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) by 
considering the stopler- samuelson theorem proved that labor demand was not influenced by trade across 
different industries. (Sachs, Shatz, Deardorff, & Hall, 1994) said that technology changes have stronger impact 
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on labor demand than trade. Moreover (Revenga, 1992) said that in US manufacturing industries wages and 
employment were negatively affected by the rise in trade volume. 
3. Theoretical framework 
Economic regulation theory was introduced in the literature for the first time (Jalilian, et al., 2007). Economic 
regulation is supported due to the failure of market economy caused by economies of scale in production, 
imperfect information and imperfect markets, externalities and improper wealth and income distribution in 
market economy. Developing countries owing to their poor and in-transparent economic and political structures 
face market failure with intense magnitude and hence need government regulation (Stiglitz, 1998). 
But it is always not necessary that regulation will bring better results than the market system. The same 
imperfections which reduce efficiency of the markets to deliver may also hinder the performance of the 
regulatory policies (Djankov et al., 2002).  (Shapiro & Willig, 1990) stated that if state has both the ownership 
and regulatory authority then it will bring better results and gap of information will not be created. But in case of 
state ownership the incentives to best utilize the resources become sluggish and results in poor performance of 
regulation as well (Hayek, 1945).  
For regulation to bring better economic welfare outcomes, it must be free of personal interest of the politicians. 
Because if political biasedness is not ruled out from the regulatory process it will always bring sub-optimal 
results for the economy and society due to poor bargaining between different interest groups  (Newbery, 1999: 
134; also, Laffont, 1999b). Regulators normally make decisions in the favor of producers from where they can 
reap highest benefits of the rent seekers under the dilemma of regulatory and producers capture (Reagan, 1987). 
However political capture is even greater threat where regulation is imposed to meet political ends only. Thus 
the regulatory quality of any economy and their expected outcomes in terms of economic welfare must be 
framed in the context of their institutions. Economic development, efficiency of production and exchange of any 
economy are determined by the rules set by the institutions of that economy (Jalilian, et al., 2007).  
 “Institution building” which also includes the development of the an effective regulatory regime is a major 
problem faced by the economies passing from their transition and development phase at present (Kirkpatrick and 
Parker, 2004). Coming to the particular relationship between different regulatory policies of the government and 
employment we have individual correlational studies creating this link. Government intervention to create jobs 
through government expenditures, subsidies, trade regulation, agricultural and environmental policies exerts 
impact on employment in different ways. 
Theoretically higher public spending stimulates aggregate demand. As the demand for labor is also derived from 
aggregate demand, it also raise the level of employment and productivity, higher productivity increase wages and 
accelerates GDP growth of the economy (Hassan, 2008). Thus government intervention through public spending 
leads to higher employment and economic growth. While trade increases the wage gap in the country; according 
to the Stopler-Samuelson
1
 theorem cheap imports from abroad will decrease the wages of low skilled labors and 
increase those of with higher education and skills (Morrison Paul & Siegel, 2001). Thus trade affects the 
employment and composition of labor in the country. 
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Another type of government regulation is made through subsidies. Theoretically subsidies reduce the cost of 
labor which encourages employment and reduce the cost of production in the competitive markets due to 
increase in production at higher employment rate and, in the case of marginal stock subsidies, entry will be 
encouraged. Moreover firms which are in the business of exporting also get the benefit from SESP (selective 
employment subsidies) in the shape of export subsidies.  Firms bear labor cost earlier in case of temporary 
subsidy which results in the accumulation of inventories and increased investment. This will lead to increase the 
labor hiring in addition to the normal; requirement. Thus subsidy results in job creation in the economy (Bishop 
& Haveman, 1979).  
 Hypothesis: On the basis of all above discussion we propose a significant relationship between regulatory 
quality and employment.  The direction of movement of which will be determined after empirical testing. In the 
next sections we will test this hypothesis with the help of econometric technique.   
4. Data and Methodology 
Two major indicators of governance are mainly used by the researchers to judge the regulatory quality. They are 
ICRG (international country risk guide) covering political, economic and financial risk facing the economy 
published by political risk services group (Neumayer, 2002; Olson et al., 1998). Second measures of governance 
quality are world governance indicators. We have focused on the regulatory quality and have taken it form the 
world governance indicators as we are interested to check its impact on the level of employment. Regulatory 
quality index is constructed to measure the burden of regulation on business due to the inefficiency of the 
quantitative controls and is used as a proxy for the effectiveness of the results of the applying regulatory 
instruments. The index value lies from 0 to 100 where 100 denote highest score on the regulatory quality 
performance and 0 stands for the poorest performance. The dependent variable of study is the employment level 
which is measured in thousands and it’s data has been collected from the International labor organization (ILO) 
data base. The data of the  control variables has been obtained from world development indicators (WDI) data 
base and they are: Trade openness, Terms of trade, capital labor ratio and gross domestic product. Trade 
openness is the ratio of trade volume to gross domestic product (GDP), terms of trade is the ratio of export price 
index to import price index, capital labor ratio is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to total labor force, 
gross domestic product (GDP) is the total market value of all final goods and services produced with in the 
geographical boundaries of a country. Based upon the variables discussed above following double log basic 
econometrics model has been formulated for the analysis. 
 LEmpit =  β0 +  β1 LREGQit + β2 LTOTit + β3LGDPit + β4 LCLRit + β5 LTOit + εit      
 
Where: 
 Empit =Total employment in thousands of country i at time t 
 REGQit =Regulatory quality of country i at time t 
 TOTit = Terms of trade of country i at time t 
 GDPit =Gross domestic product of  country i at time t 
 CLRit  = Capital labor ratio of  country i at time t 
 TOit = Trade openness (Exports + Imports / GDP) of country i at time t 
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 εit =Error Term   i =Country (i =1,2,3,……….6)    t =Years (t = 1996,1997,……….2011)  L = Natural 
logarithm 
Hausman test has been applied to the given model in order to determine whether fixed effect estimator is a better 
measure or random effect model is more appropriate, based upon the results of hausman test fixed, effect is 
found to be more relevant measure and results of fixed effect model  are given in table 2,in table 3 are the results 
of fixed effect model with Robust standard errors, in table 4 are the results of Generalized Method of Moment 
(GMM). 
5. Results and Interpretations 
At the beginning, the model has been estimated by using both fixed effects model and random effects model. 
Then Hausman test has been applied to check whether it is appropriate to use fixed effects model or random 
effects model for estimation of the model, given below are the results of Hausman test.  
                          Table 1  Hausman Test 
 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
169.11 5 0.0000 
The results of the Hausman Test, The Chi-Sq. Statistic and p-value show that  the value of chi2 (169.11) is 
greater than probability (0.000) and as the value of probability is 0.000 which is less than 5% level of 
significance (0.05) so we reject the null which states random effect is better and conclude that the fixed effect 
model estimation  is more appropriate . Therefore, econometric model has been estimated by using the fixed 
effects model and results are given below 
                                          Table 2, Results of Fixed Effect Model 
  Dependent variable=Lemp 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors t-value Probabilities 
LREGQ .0729 .0264 2.76 0.007*** 
LTOT -.0733 .0289 -2.53 0.014** 
LGDP .4557 .0281 16.19 0.000*** 
LCLR -.2018 .0256 -7.87 0.000*** 
LTO -.1586 .0374 -4.24 0.000*** 
C .4621 .7599 0.61   0.545 
 F statistics = 227.73, Prob. > F = 0.0000. *** shows 1%, ** shows 5%, level of significance, 
respectively. 
The result obtained by applying fixed effect model reveals that the coefficient of our main variable of interest 
that is the Regulatory Quality (shows the capacity of the government in the formulation and implementation of 
effective policies and regulation which enhances the functioning of private sector development) is positive and 
statistically significant as well which means that if the regulatory quality is improved then it leads to increase in 
the employment level , By improving the Regulatory Quality we can enhance the employment level, so the 
problem of unemployment can be tackled by improving the Regulatory Quality. The next variable is terms of 
trade which is having negative sign of coefficient and the variable is statistically significant as well, it shows that 
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an increase in terms of trade leads to reduce the employment, it may happen in two ways, on one hand an 
increase in terms of trade means that domestic goods and services are expensive and it may lead to reduction in 
export of goods and services, which may lead to reduction in economic activities of export oriented industries 
domestically and ultimately reduction in employment, on the other hand an increase in terms of trade means that 
foreign goods  are cheaper than that of domestically produced goods which may result in increase of import of 
foreign goods and domestic goods may be substituted with foreign goods, this may lead to reduction in economic 
activities of the import substitution industries which ultimately may lead to reduction in employment. The 
coefficient of gross domestic product is positive and variable is statistically significant which shows that an 
increase in economic growth leads to increase in employment, it is quite obvious as an increase in economic 
growth means an increase in overall economic activities of the country which will eventually enhance the 
employment in the countries as more labor will be required to meet the growing needs of the economy. Capital 
labor ratio has negative impact on employment generation as depicted by the results it has negative coefficient 
and the variable is statistically significant as well, it is in accordance with the theory as this ratio goes up it 
means capital is used in larger proportion as compared to labor so it leads to capital intensive method of 
production which results in labor saving process eventually reducing employment level. Trade openness is found 
to negative and statistically significant and it may seem to be unusual but may happen due to the fact that trade 
openness brings modern technology in the country through imports. This technology can increase the 
productivity of labor. But what are the consequences if this modern technology replaces labor force and leads to 
capital intensive production both in export oriented and import substitution industries. If this happens, then 
demand for labor decreases as firms hire less labor force and this leads to less employment. Another channel 
may be that a country can import goods from abroad which are cheap as compared to produced domestically, this 
may lead to less demand for labor in import substitution industries and it can ultimately cause lower employment 
level. Intercept bears the positive sign but it is statistically insignificant. 
Diagnostic Tests 
a. Wald test for GroupWise heteroskedasticity 
             H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
              chi2 (6)  =      20.45     Prob>chi2 =   0.0023 
The results of Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity  show that we can reject the null hypothesis of no 
group wise heteroskedasticity  as the value of probability is 0.0023 which is  less than 5% level of significance 
(0.05),so we can conclude that there is problem of group wise heteroskedasticity.  
b. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
        H0: no first order autocorrelation 
         F(  1,      5) =   15.518            Prob > F =      0.0110 
The results of Wooldridge test show that we can reject the null hypothesis of no auto correlation as probability 
value is 0.0110 which is  less than 5% level of significance (0.05), so we conclude that the problem of auto 
correlation exists. 
 c. Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence 
           Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -0.070,            Pr = 0.9441 
           Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =   0.345    
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The results of Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence show that there exists no cross sectional dependence 
as null of cross sectional independence is not rejected as p value is 0.9441 which is greater than 5% level of 
significance (0.05). 
As the results of diagnostic tests show that the model suffers from the problem of GroupWise heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation, so it is necessary to take into account these problems in order to have reliable results. In 
order to tackle the problem of GroupWise heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, white period standard errors 
and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) have been used respectively, so the results obtain are free from 
heteroskedasticity and problem of autocorrelation is handled. 
Here below are the results obtained by robust standard errors that are free from heteroskedasticity and it shows 
that all variables retained the same sign as the earlier results with the only difference that the variable “terms of 
trade” is turned out to be statistically insignificant now. 
                 Table 3 Results of Fixed Effect Model with Robust Standard Errors 
           Dependent variable=Lemp 
Variables Coefficient Robust Standard 
Errors 
t-value Probabilities 
LREGQ .0729 .0327 2.23 0.076** 
LTOT -.0733 .0480 -1.53 0.187 
LGDP .4557 .0211 21.56 0.000*** 
LCLR -.2018 .0618 -3.26 0.022** 
LTO -.1586 .0397 -3.99 0.010*** 
C .4621 .6825 0.68 0.528 
  *** shows 1%, ** shows 5%, level of significance, respectively. 
Given below are the results obtained from GMM ,which accounts for the problem of autocorrelation, there are 
two main differences with the original results, one the variable “terms of trade” is turned out to be statistically 
insignificant and number two “the intercept” has changed its sign, it has turned negative from positive but still 
insignificant, rest of the variables retained the same sign but are highly statistically significant now and our main 
findings are same as from the original estimation, so we may say that our results may be reliable. 
                         Table 4 Dynamic panel-data estimation (GMM Results)   
  Number of instruments =     55               Wald chi2(5)          =    551.96 
  One-step results                                        Prob > chi2           =    0.0000 
Dependent variable=Lemp  
 Instruments for differenced equation                      Instruments for level equation 
 GMM-type: L(2/.).lemp                                           Standard: _cons 
 
                        
Variables 
Coefficient Standard Errors z-value Probabilities 
LREGQ .1221 .0190 6.41  0.000*** 
LTOT -.0070 .0252 -0.28 0.781 
LGDP .4824 .0371 13.00   0.000*** 
LCLR -.2704 .0359 -7.53   0.000*** 
LTO -.1286 .0385 -3.33  0.001*** 
C -.2616 .8433 -0.31 0.756 
  *** shows 1%, ** shows 5%, level of significance, respectively.  
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      6. Conclusion 
Theory of economic regulation gained importance in economics literature in the era of 1990s. Market failure 
caused by market imperfections has legitimized government intervention and regulation in the economic affairs 
of the state. But positive response to regulation in developed countries and failure of regulatory institutions in 
developing countries have created doubts about the role of regulation in developing countries. This study is an 
effort to explore relation between regulatory quality and employment generation in 6 developing economies of 
Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand) from 1996 -2011. Panel Model has been 
assessed by using fixed effects technique. Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence is applied in order to 
check if there is any cross sectional dependence. The results show that there is now cross sectional dependence, 
Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data has 
been applied. Both of the tests have shown that model suffers from group-wise heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, the problem of heteroskedasticity is removed by using robust standard errors and the problem of 
autocorrelation is tackled by applying GMM. We have found a strong positive effect of regulatory quality on the 
level of employment in selected economies. GDP has significant positive impact on employment generation as 
well. While terms of trade, trade openness and capital labor ratio are significantly reducing employment level in 
our sample. Developing countries of Asia like in our sample suffer from low quality of governance and weak 
institutions. This weak performance of institutions lower their efficiency of regulatory policies to enhance 
economic welfare and to generate employment. We suggest enhancing quality of regulatory institutions to tackle 
the issue of wide range unemployment in the developing economies like of Asia. 
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